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This article evaluates structural, institutional, and actor-centered explanations of the collapse of
the Peruvian party system around 1990 and its surprising partial recovery in 2001. It begins by
describing the changes in the dependent variable, the emergence, collapse, and partial resurrec-
tion of the 1980s Peruvian party system. The next section examines the argument that the large
size and rapid growth of the informal sector undermined the party system and led to its collapse.
The author shows that the evidence does not support this argument. The article then examines
changes in the electoral system. The author demonstrates that, contrary to theoretical expecta-
tions, the changes in the electoral system do not correlate with the observed changes in the party
system. The final section shows that performance failure by political elites, including corruption
in government, was more important than social cleavages or electoral institutions in the collapse
and partial recovery of the party system.
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“
Lima is proof that there are no knowable limits to what people will put
up with” (Guillermoprieto, 1990). So wrote a visiting journalist in 1990
when inflation spiraled out of control, production plummeted, and thousands
of Peruvians were being murdered in political violence that some feared was
a precursor to genocide. Less noticed amid the chaos and carnage of late-
1980s Peru were the death throes of the party system that had dominated
Peruvian politics during the previous decade. In 1990 the party system
showed signs of exhaustion when Alberto Fujimori’s electoral tsunami
washed away the familiar political landscape. By the end of Fujimori’s first
term in office, not a party remained from the 1980s that was capable of seri-
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ously contesting power. Rarely have party systems collapsed so completely
and quickly.
A decade later Peruvians witnessed another amazing event, as the Fujimori
regime suddenly collapsed and politicians and parties long thought dead
sprang to life. The return of the 1980s politicians was even more astonishing
given the thoroughness withwhich they had been destroyed over the previous
10 years. The so-called traditional parties that together received more than
90%of the presidential vote in the 1980s won less than 7%of the presidential
vote in 1995 and less than 2% in 2000.Manywere surprised, then, when can-
didates associated with these parties won more than 50% of the presidential
first-round vote in 2001.
The unexpected collapse and the surprising partial resurrection of the
1980s parties provide an opportunity to reexamine our understanding of the
forces that shape party systems. Can the dramatic changes observed in Peru
best be explained by changes in the social cleavages underlying parties, by
the role played by political institutions, or by theway political elites shape the
party system?1 This article argues that the collapse and partial rebirth of
Peru’s party systemwas due farmore to the actions of elites and the judgment
of voters than to structural or institutional causes. The article begins by
describing changes in the dependent variable and then examines explana-
tions focusing on structures, institutions, and political elites.
WHAT HAPPENED: THE RISE, COLLAPSE,
AND PARTIAL RESURRECTION OF A PARTY SYSTEM
The 1980s party system was born in the 1978 Constitutional Assembly
and 1980 general elections that endedmore than a decade ofmilitary rule. By
late 1980 four political forces had emerged that dominated politics for the
rest of the decade: the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA),
Popular Action (AP), the Popular Christian Party (PPC), and the United Left
(IU).
APRA already had a storied career stretching back five decades when it
gained a plurality of the seats in the 1978 Constitutional Assembly. Over-
coming the death of its founding leader in 1979, APRA emerged as a leading
center-left party in the 1980s. APwas APRA’s primary rival in the 1960s and
1980s, winning the presidency after military rule in 1963 and again in 1980.
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1. See Mainwaring (1999, pp. 21-22) and Tanaka (1998, pp. 24-33) on structural, institu-
tional, and elite explanations of party system change. On the collapse of the Peruvian party sys-
tem, see Carrión, 1998; Cotler, 1995; Lynch, 1999; McClintock, 1994; Planas, 1996, 2000;
Roberts, 1999; Tantaleán, 1996; Tuesta Soldevilla, 1995.
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1212 Table 1
Electoral Competition in Peru, 1978-2001
1978 1980 1985 1990 1992 1995 2000 2001
% of % of % of % of % of % of % of % of
Assembly Lower House Lower House Lower House CCD Congressional Congressional Congressional
Party and Alliance Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats
AP Abst. Abst. 38.9 54.4 8.4 5.6 — (14.4)a Abst. Abst. 3.3 3.3 2.5 2.5 4.2 2.5
PPC 23.8 25.0 9.6 5.6 11.1 6.7 — (13.9)a 9.8 10.0 3.1 2.5 — — — —
Libertad — — — — — — — (5.0)a Abst. Abst. — — — — — —
FREDEMO — — — — — — 30.1 34.4b — — — — — — — —
FIM — — — — — — c 3.9 7.1 8.8 4.9 5.0 7.6 7.5 11.0 9.2
Renovación — — — — — — — — 7.1 7.5 3.0 2.5 — — — —
Avancemos — — — — — — — — — — — — 3.1 2.5 — —
Solidaridad Nacional — — — — — — — — — — — — 4.0 4.2 — —
Unidad Nacional — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 13.8 14.2
Right 23.8 25.0 48.5 60.0 19.5 12.3 30.1 38.3 24.0 26.3 14.3 13.3 17.2 16.7 29.0 25.9
FOCEP 12.3 12.0 1.7 0.0 — — — — — — — — — — — —
PCP/UI 5.9 6.0 3.4 1.1 — — — — — — — — — — — —
PSR + UDP 11.2 10.0 4.3 1.7 — — — — — — — — — — — —
UNIR Abst. Abst. 4.7 1.1 — — — — — — — — — — — —
PRT — — 4.2 1.7 — — — — — — — — — — — —
APS 0.6 — — — — — — — — — — — — —
IU — — — — 24.4 26.7 10.0 8.9 Abst. Abst. 1.9 1.7 — — — —
IS — — — — — — 5.3 2.2 Abst. Abst. — — — — — —
MDI — — — — — — — — 5.5 5.0 — — — — — —
Left 29.4 28.0 18.9 5.6 24.4 26.7 15.3 11.1 5.5 5.0 1.9 1.7 — — — —
APRA 35.3 37.0 26.5 32.2 50.1 59.4 25.0 29.4 Abst. Abst. 6.5 6.7 5.5 5 19.7 23.3
 at UNIV O
F O
KLAHO
M
A on January 20, 2016
cps.sagepub.com
D
ow
nloaded from
 
1213
C90/NM — — — — — — 16.5 17.8 49.6 55.0 52.1 55.8 42.2 43.3 4.8 2.5
UPP — — — — — — — — — — 14.0 14.2 2.6 2.5 4.1 5.0
Perú Posible — — — — — — — — — — 4.2 4.2 23.2 24.2 26.3 37.5
Somos Peru — — — — — — — — — — — — 7.2 6.7 5.8 3.3
Other parties 11.6 10.0 6.1 2.2 5.9 1.7 13.0 3.5 20.8 13.8 7 4.1 2.2 1.7 10.3 2.5
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales (http://www.onpe.gob.pe); Tuesta Soldevilla, 2001.
Note:Abst. = abstained;AP=PopularAction; PPC=PopularChristian Party; FREDEMO=Democratic Front; FIM= IndependentMoralizingFront; FOCEP
=Worker Peasant Student and Popular Front; PCP = Peruvian Communist Party; UI = Unity of the Left; PSR = Revolutionary Socialist Party; UDP = Popular
Democratic Unity; UNIR =Union of the Revolutionary Left; PRT =Revolutionary Party of theWorkers; APS = Socialist Political Action; IS = Socialist Left;
MDI=DemocraticMovement of theLeft;APRA=AmericanPopularRevolutionaryAlliance;C90/NM=Change90/NewMajority;UPP=Union forPeru.
a. The seats in parentheses are part of the total of 34.4% of the seats belonging to FREDEMO.
b. Includes SODE’s 2 seats (1.1%).
c. Tuesta does not disaggregate FIM’s vote total from the category of “others” in the 1990 elections.
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Reformist in the 1960s, AP was perceived as a party of the moderate right in
the 1980s. The PPC, somewhat farther to the right, benefited fromAP’s boy-
cott of the constitutional assembly to become the second-largest party there,
and in 1980 it formed a governing alliancewithAP.On the left, amultitude of
parties vied for power separately in the 1978 Constitutional Assembly and
the 1980 general elections before forming an electoral front—the IU—that
held together for most of the decade. Together, these four political forces
accounted for well over 90% of the legislative and presidential votes until the
1990 elections.
Although this party system never became well institutionalized,2 its col-
lapse stunnedmost observers. In retrospect, we can see that the collapse took
place in three stages: 1987-1989, 1989-1990, and 1992-1995. Between 1987
and 1989 the system began to show its weakness as the two leaders with the
best chance of becoming president in 1990 sought alternatives to the existing
parties. On the right, Mario Vargas Llosa’s dissatisfaction with the existing
parties led him to found the FreedomMovement (Libertad) in 1987, although
he subsequently formed an electoral alliance with AP and the PPC. On the
left, ideological and personal conflicts led former Lima mayor Alfonso
Barrantes to break with the IU and found a new electoral alliance in 1989.
The second stage of party system collapse began in late 1989 and contin-
ued through 1990, as the traditional parties lost the municipality of Lima and
the presidency while retaining a majority of the national municipal and con-
gressional vote. The proportion of votes going to municipal candidates from
other than the four traditional parties went from just less than 8% nationally
in 1986 to almost 29% in 1989. The shock to the party systemwas far greater
in Lima, as political outsider Ricardo Belmont easily out-polled the mayoral
candidates from the traditional parties.
The 1990 presidential votes went primarily to candidates who cast them-
selves as alternatives to the traditional parties. Vargas Llosa and Fujimori
shared 62% of the first-round vote and went on to contest a runoff won hand-
ily by Fujimori. This was in sharp contrast to the previous presidential elec-
tion in 1985, when citizens cast 97% of their votes for the presidential candi-
dates of the four major parties. Although weakened, the traditional parties
held their own in the legislative election of 1990, winning approximately
66% of the legislative votes (as compared to more than 94% in 1985).
As the Fujimori administration took its first steps, two contrasting views
of the party systemweremanifested. On one hand, all of the presidential run-
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2. According to two cross-national studies, Peru’s party system was the least institutional-
ized in Latin America (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995, pp. 4-17; Payne, Zovato, Carrillo Flórez, &
Zavala, 2002, pp. 142-143).
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off votes went to outsider candidates, which gave rise to the view that the
1980s party system had collapsed. On the other hand, traditional parties still
held almost two thirds of the seats in congress, and traditional parties had
played important roles in the presidential election, giving rise to the view that
even though changes were evidently underway, the party system itself was
largely intact.
The third stage (1992-1995) saw the collapse of the party system become
complete, as traditional parties were reduced to irrelevancy in the 1995 presi-
dential race and captured only a small number of legislative seats. Fujimori
resolved his conflicts with the traditional parties in congress by means of an
unconstitutional presidential coup in 1992. After international pressure
forced Fujimori to hold new elections, most of the traditional parties (APRA,
AP, IU) and Libertad boycotted the elections, whereas the PPC and groups
that splintered from APRA, IU, and Libertad contested the elections along
with several other parties.
In the municipal elections in 1993, all of the 1980s parties again partici-
pated and won 37% of the national vote. Two years later, however, these par-
ties had all but disappeared as viable contenders for the presidency. Together,
the traditional parties received less than 7% of the presidential vote and 16%
of the congressional vote in 1995. By 2000 the IU and the PPC had lost their
accreditation before the National Electoral Board, and the only remaining
1980s parties (APRA and AP) mustered less than 2% of the presidential and
8% of the congressional vote between them. No traditional party candidate
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Table 2
Growth of Urban Population and Informal Sector in Peru, 1940-1993
Data from the Instituto Data from the
Nacional de Estadística e Informática, Peru International Labour Organization
National National National Lima
Urban Informal Nonagricultural Informal National Urban
Population Sector Informal Sector Sector Informal Sector
Year (%) (%) (%) (%) Year (%)
1940 35 32 32 12 — —
1961 47 48 29 23 1960 47
1972 60 47 28 — 1970 41
1981 65 47 29 25 1980 41
1993 70 43 — — 1989 39
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática, 1992 and 1993 censuses; International
Labour Organization data from Portes & Schauffler, 1996, p. 156.
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had placed first or second in a presidential election since 1985, and many
believed that none would again do so.
The reports of their death proved premature, however, as some of themor-
ibund parties of the past and their leaders suddenly came alive after the dra-
matic collapse of the Fujimori regime in 2000. One traditional party leader
(Valentín Paniagua, AP) served very successfully as interim president, and in
the 2001 presidential elections two of the three major contenders in the first
round were traditional party figures. The 2001 frontrunner was outsider
Alejandro Toledo, who received 36.5% of the first-round presidential vote
(down from 40% in 2000), and whose Perú Posible (PP) won 26% of the leg-
islative vote. The PPC’s Lourdes Flores Nano formed a new electoral alli-
ance, Unidad Nacional (UN) and won 24% of the first-round presidential
vote, while the UN congressional list won 14% of the votes and seats.3 For-
mer president Alan García won 26% of the first-round presidential vote, up
from APRA’s 1.4% in 2000. APRA’s congressional vote was also up, from
5.5% in 2000 to 20% in 2001 (and 23% of the seats, making it the second-
largest party in the legislature). Another traditional party, AP, supported
Toledo in the presidential race and won 4% of the legislative votes. Toledo
went on to win the runoff, with 53% of the vote to García’s 47%. Traditional
party politicians ended up with just over 50% of the first-round presidential
votes and at least 31 seats (26%) in the legislature.
Having seen what happened, we can now turn to the question of why. Did
changes in the structure of society provoke changes in the party system?How
did the electoral system shape the party system?Were the collapse and partial
recovery of the party system caused by the actions of political elites? The
next sections of this article will address these questions.
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3. The classification of presidential candidate Lourdes Flores Nano and the National Unity
(UN) electoral alliance as traditional or nontraditional presents some difficulties. Flores Nano’s
party, the Popular Christian Party (PPC), lost its official status after the 1995 elections and was
unable to meet the requirements for registration prior to the 2000 election, although a few PPC
candidates found their way onto the lists of other parties. Flores Nano herself did not run for
office in 2000, and when she ran for president in 2001, she formed a new electoral alliance that
included the PPC. The analytical problem in this case is the inverse ofVargas Llosa and theDem-
ocratic Front (FREDEMO) in 1990. Vargas Llosa was a nontraditional politician, but the bulk of
FREDEMO candidates elected to congress came from traditional parties (Popular Action [AP]
and PPC), and it was difficult to know whether FREDEMO’s votes should be counted as repre-
senting traditional or nontraditional parties. In the case of Flores Nano, she is clearly a politician
associatedwith a traditional party, thePPC, butUN includesmanypoliticians not associatedwith
the 1980s parties. In this text, I count Flores Nano’s presidential votes as support for a traditional
politician, but I do not count the UN’s legislative votes as support for the 1980s parties.
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Table 3
Legislative and Presidential Electoral and Party System Data, Peru, 1962-2001
Legislative Electoral and Party System
Open Multiple
List Departmental Effective
or or Single Smallest Number Presidential
Number Closed National No. of Average Party of Parties Legislative 1980s
of List Electoral Legislators District Represented Contingent Parties
Election Chambers PR Districts Elected Magnitude (% Vote) Votes Seats (% Seats) (% Vote)
1963 Lower house 2 Closed Multiple 140 5.8 — — 3.54 35.3 —
1963 Senate Closed Multiple 45 1.9 — — 3.25 44.4 —
1978 Constitutional Assembly 1 Open Single 100 100.0 1.9 4.77 4.44 — —
1980 Lower house 2 Closed Multiple 180 7.2 2.6 4.18 2.47 54.4 —
1980 Senate Closed Single 60 60.0 1.4 3.85 3.42 43.3 —
1985 Lower house 2 Open Multiple 180 6.9  1.0 3.02 2.26 59.4 94.0
1985 Senate Open Single 60 60.0 1.7 2.89 2.79 52.5 100.0
1990 Lower house 2 Open Multiple 180 6.9 0.4 5.03 4.04 17.8 60.6
1990 Senate Open Single 60 60.0 2.0 4.38 3.95 22.6 62.9
1992 CCD 1 Open Single 80 80.0 1.7 3.60 3.00 55.0 9.8
1995 Congress 1 Open Single 120 120.0 0.8 3.30 2.91 55.8 14.8
2000 Congress 1 Open Single 120 120.0 2.2 4.00 3.81 43.3 8.0
2001 Congress 1 Open Multiple 120 4.8 1.4 6.63 4.37 37.5 23.9
(continud)
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1218 Table 3 (continued)
Presidential Electoral and Party System
Incumbent 1980s Party
Reelection Actual No. Effective No. Candidates
Election Type of Electoral System Threshold Allowed of Parties of Parties (% Vote)
1962 Presidential Top 3, congressional runoff 33.3% valid vote No 7 3.39 —
1963 Presidential Top 3, congressional runoff 33.3% valid vote No 4 2.98 —
1980 Presidential Top 2, congressional runoff 36.0% valid vote No 15 3.45 —
1985 Presidential Top 2, popular runoff 50.0% total vote No 9 2.76 98.4
1990 Presidential Top 2, popular runoff 50.0% total vote No 9 3.95 32.3
1995 Presidential Top 2, popular runoff 50.0% valid vote Yes 14 2.14 6.7
2000 Presidential Top 2, popular runoff 50.0% valid vote Yes 9 2.42 1.8
2001 Presidential Top 2, popular runoff 50.0% valid vote No 8 3.72 50.1
Source: Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales (http://www.onpe.gob.pe); Tuesta Soldevilla, 2001.
Note: PR = proportional representation; CCD = democratic constitutional congress.
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WHY IT HAPPENED I:
SOCIAL CLEAVAGES AND THE PARTY SYSTEM
One way to understand the emergence and transformation of party sys-
tems is to see political parties as expressions of social forces. In this view,
party systems reflect a society’s fundamental social cleavages, and although
a party system may become “frozen,” changes in the structure of society can
lead to changes in the party system (Lipset & Rokaan, 1967). Just how
changes in the social structuremay affect the party system is not always clear,
and such effects can be difficult to disentangle from those caused by other
factors.
Like most Latin American countries, Peru went from being predomi-
nantly rural to predominantly urban in the decades after World War II.
Between 1940 and 1972 the proportion of Peruvians living in cities mush-
roomed from 35% to 60% (see Table 2). The rate of urbanization began to
level off after 1970, with the urban population rising to 65% in 1981, 70% in
1993, and 72% in 2000. The transformative effects of successive waves of
urban migration have been noted by many analysts of Peruvian politics and
society (see, e.g., Cotler, 1995; De Soto, 1986; Franco, 1991; Grompone,
1991; López, 1991; Matos Mar, 1985; McClintock, 1999).
Howdo thesemassive changes in Peru’s social structures relate to changes
in the party system? Although it is reasonable to suppose that modernization
and migration might have led to significant electoral realignments, it is not
clear that these forces explain the collapse of the party system beginning in
the late 1980s and the partial recovery of some traditional parties and politi-
cians in 2001. The oldest Peruvian party still around today,APRA, began com-
peting for office in 1931 when modernization and migration had advanced
little in comparison to what would come after WorldWar II. However, while
Peru went through momentous changes between the 1930s and the 1970s—
as did APRA—the proportion of the vote going to APRA varied surprisingly
little over these decades. APRA received 31% of the presidential vote in
1931, 33% in 1962, 34% in 1964, and 35% of the vote for the 1978 Constitu-
tional Assembly. Despite massive socioeconomic changes, the performance
of AP founder Fernando Belaunde was also surprisingly stable, with 37% of
the votes in 1956, 32% in 1962, 39% in 1963, and 45% in 1980. The party
system did see significant changes over these years, as personalist vehicles
such as the Unión Revolucionaria, the Movimiento Democrático Pradista,
and the Unión Nacional Odriísta came and went, but the degree of continuity
is nonetheless striking.
Why, then, did party competition become so volatile in the 1980s and the
party system collapse in the 1990s? In seeking to understand the collapse of
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the Peruvian party system, some authors havemade special note of the rise of
the so-called informal sector of the economy and its consequences for poli-
tics. According to one such view, “Amajor victim of the growth of the infor-
mal sector during the 1980s was the party system that had been organized
around the class cleavage since the late 1970s” (Cameron, 1994, p. 17).4
I find two problems with this argument. First, the available data show that
the expansion of the informal sector was not large enough or timed in such a
way as to be able to explain the collapse of the Peruvian party system. Census
data provided by Peru’s Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática
(INEI) give perhaps the best indication about the way the informal sector
grew at the national level over the 1940-1993 period.5 The proportion of all
workers belonging to the informal sector nationwide rose rapidly between
1940 and 1961, from 32% to 48%, but then leveled off through 1972 and
1981 before falling to 43% by 1993 (see Table 2). Interpreting this informa-
tion is not straightforward. On one hand, it appears that the growth of the
informal sector from 1940 to 1960 took place only in the agricultural sector,
as the nonagricultural informal sector fell between 1940 and 1960 (and con-
tinued to fall slowly through 1981). On the other hand, in metropolitan Lima
the proportion of workers in the informal sector rose quickly from 12% to
23% between 1940 and 1961, only to grow slowly to 25% by 1981.
The International Labour Organization (ILO) has estimated the size of the
urban informal sector for a number of countries in LatinAmerica since 1960.
According to the ILO, the national urban informal sector in Peru fell from
47% in 1960 to 41% in 1970 and in 1980, and then to 39% in 1989. These data
apparently reflect the same tendencies as the INEI’s data on national nonagri-
cultural informal workers. Although there is some divergence between these
indices, they coincide on one point: According to all of these measures, the
size of the informal sector in Peru saw little or no proportionate growth
between 1960 and 1993.
This contradictswhatmost analysts believe is true about Peru. There are at
least two possible explanations for this contradiction. First, the definition and
measures of the informal sector as compiled by the INEI and the ILO may
simply not be adequate for the task at hand, and their use may mask the phe-
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4. In later work, Cameron and Mauceri (1997, p. 6) have continued to make the argument
that “the growth of the informal sector undermined the party system and created an opportunity
for anti-system candidates,” and this argument has been echoed by many others (see, e.g.,
Schmidt, 1996, pp. 322-325).
5. Peru’s censuses have not specifically inquired about informal or formal status, but the
Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática (INEI) derives estimates based on other data col-
lected. Whatever their limitations, the census data are the among the few data available for Peru
at the national level and the only such data I have located that go back as far as 1940.
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nomena we wish to examine. It could be that the proportion of informal
workers in Peru has grown significantly but that the INEI and ILO measures
are the wrong ones to capture this trend. Second, it may be that analysts
impressed by the growth in the absolute number of informal sector workers
have not paid sufficient attention to the question of whether the proportion of
informal sector workers has grown similarly. With rapid national population
growth and massive rural-to-urban migration, the urban population in Peru
grew from 2.2 million in 1940 to 15.5 million in 1993—an increase of over
600%. The number of informal sector workersmay have grown rapidlywith-
out a similar rise in the proportion of informal sector workers.
The most detailed data on the urban informal sector in Peru are limited to
Lima, and these data show that the informal sector in Lima stood at 38%
when the 1980s party system was born in 1978 (see Figure 1).6 The propor-
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Figure 1. Evolution of Informal Sector in Metropolitan Lima, 1975-1997
Source: International Labour Organization, 2002; Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática,
1992.
6. The Central Reserve Bank (BCR), which reported the size of Lima’s informal sector
between 1975 and 1986,measured it as a percentage of the employed economically active popu-
lation. The Ministry of Labor (MT), which has calculated the size of the informal sector since
1981,measured it as a percentage of the total economically active population. The twomeasures
show identical trends, and the BCR figures reported in the text have been adjusted to follow the
MT’s definition. According to the MT, the informal sector includes
1. The small propertyownerwhoproduces bymeans of the family,whodoes not use sala-
ried workers, but who nonetheless is integrated in the market selling what he or she pro-
duces. 2.Workers whowork in homes with different modalities with respect to the prop-
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tion of informal sector workers reached a low of 33% in 1981 before climb-
ing to 42% by the time the party system began to collapse. It continued to
expand through the 1990s, reaching 49% by the time the party system col-
lapsed completely in 1995. In contrast with the national-level census data—
which show little informal sector growth after 1960—these data indicate that
the informal sector in Lima grewby asmuch as 11 percentage points between
the birth of the party system in 1978 and its final demise in 1995.
Do these data support the argument that the rapid growth of the informal
sector led to the collapse of the party system? Between the formative elec-
tions of 1978 and the 1989 elections inwhich the collapse of the party system
in Lima first began to be noted, the informal sector rose from 38% to 42% of
those employed in Lima. Although this expansion may have had electoral
consequences, it remains true that the collapse of the party system began
when the informal sector was only slightly larger than it had been when the
party system was formed. The 1980s party system deteriorated further and
collapsed completely following the 1989 municipal elections, while the
informal sector continued to rise, but the two sets of changes are on different
orders of magnitude. As we have seen, the traditional parties saw their share
of the presidential vote drop from 98% to just 7% between 1985 and 1995
(see Table 1), while the informal sector grew from 41% to 49% of those
working in Lima (see Figure 1). Perhaps the growth of the informal sector
contributed to undermining support for traditional parties, but a better argu-
ment would be required to show how such massive electoral changes could
be caused by relativelymoderate informal sector growth, as opposed to other
changes taking place at the same time.
The second problem with the argument that the growth of the informal
sector led to the collapse of the party system is that most of the available data
indicate that the electoral behavior of informal sector workers in Lima was
not significantly different from that of lower class formal sectorworkers. The
electoral data presented by Cameron (1994) show that the voting patterns
associated with blue-collar workers are very similar to those associated with
informal workers, supporting his assertion that “the informal sector is not an
electoral bloc distinct from other lower-income groups” (p. 40). If this were
true, even a massive expansion of the informal sector would do little to
explain the demise of the party system.
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erty of the means of production and production materials. 3. Independent workers and
those who work in small workshops. 4. Street vendors with heterogeneous activities
(INEI, 1992, p. 116, my translation). On Peru’s urban informal sector, see also Balbi,
1990; Bustamante, 1990; Carbonetto, 1988; Chávez, 1990; de Soto, 1986; Kelley, 1994;
Rossini&Thomas, 1990;Thomas, 1999;Tokman,1991;Wilson, 1998;Yamada, 1996.
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Perhaps it is not the growth of the informal sector but rather the fact that
the informal sector was very large to begin with that accounts for volatility in
the party system. If informal sector workers are by their nature less able to
form strong bonds with parties, Peru with its large informal sector should
expect to see significant electoral volatility.7 A comparison with other Latin
American countries supports this argument. The correlation between mean
informal sector size for 14 LatinAmerican countries between 1960 and 1989
(ILO data reported in Portes & Schauffler, 1996, p. 156) and mean electoral
volatility between the late 1970s to 2000 (Payne et al., 2002, p. 132) is strong
(Pearson’s r = .646) and significant at the .05 level (two-tailed). The distinc-
tion between this argument and the argument that volatility is due to informal
sector growth is underlined by the fact that the same ILO data that show a
relationship between informal sector size and electoral volatility also show
that the informal sector in Peru shrank between 1960 and 1989.
Explaining electoral volatility, however, is not the same as explaining party
system collapse. A party system can experience significant intrasystemic
volatility without collapse; what needs to be explained is not just volatility
but the kind of extrasystemic volatility that destroys one party system and
creates an entirely new one in its wake. In Peru, volatility between 1980 and
1985 first benefited partieswithin the system, andmuch of the legislative vol-
atility in 1990 also benefited parties and politicians with firm roots in the
1980s system. In 1995 and 2000, on the other hand, volatility benefited par-
ties born in the 1990s, to the complete detriment of the 1980s party system.
Likewise, high electoral volatility provides a context for party system change
but does little to explain why, in 2001, volatility primarily benefited parties
and politicians of the 1980s. We turn next to institutional explanations of
party system change.
WHY IT HAPPENED II:
THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM
Electoral systems shape party systems by determining how votes are
translated into legislative seats and executive positions, thereby creating
incentive structures for politicians and voters (Duverger, 1954; Grofman &
Lijphart, 1986; Rae, 1967; Sartori, 1994; Taagepera & Shugart, 1989). In
what ways did Peru’s electoral system and the changes made to it contribute
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See Grompone, 1991, for a discussion of the relationship between informal sector workers and
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between the size of the informal sector and electoral volatility in Latin America.
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to the collapse of the party system around 1990? In what ways did the elec-
toral system shape the recent resurgence in voting for politicians and parties
associatedwith the 1980s party system?Weknow that institutionsmatter, but
which institutions matter in which ways, and to what extent, is a matter for
investigation.
Electoral rules exert bothmechanical and psychological pressures (Jones,
1995, p. 13). Themechanical effects are immediate, and some psychological
effects may be as well, but when electoral rules shape party systems by shap-
ing the expectations and incentives of politicians and voters, itmay take some
experience with a new set of electoral rules before behavioral changes are
evident. In the Peruvian case, democratic electoral competition has been
interrupted or distorted repeatedly by undemocratic actions, and the electoral
system has been changed frequently within democratic bounds as well. On
some occasions, politicians and voters scarcely had time to experience a new
set of electoral institutions before thesewere undermined or changed. Conse-
quently, this discussion focuses mostly on the more immediate effects of
electoral system change.
THE LEGISLATIVE ELECTORAL SYSTEM
List proportional representation (PR) was used for the first time in the
1963 legislative elections. PR is associated with larger effective numbers of
parties than are plurality elections, but the implications for the collapse of a
particular party system are unclear. PRwould seem to allow emerging parties
greater opportunities to gain representation, but by the same token they
should allow parties in decline greater possibilities of avoiding a catastrophic
loss of representation. The fact that this most basic feature has remained
unchanged since 1963 suggests that it is an unlikely source of the massive
party system change observed in Peru since 1989.
SINGLE NATIONAL ELECTORAL DISTRICTS AND
MULTIPLE DEPARTMENTAL ELECTORAL DISTRICTS
A potentially important aspect of the legislative electoral system was the
use of different kinds of electoral districts. A single national district was
employed for at least one legislative chamber in every election between 1978
and 2000 (see Table 3). After 1992 the multiple district system that had been
used for the lower house between 1980 and 1990 (and for all legislative elec-
tions before the 1970s) was abandoned, along with bicameralism. A single
national electoral district creates a highly proportional system that might be
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thought to encourage the proliferation of small parties, because even parties
with very small proportions of the national vote can place candidates in the
legislature.Multiple electoral districts can have two effects, however:On one
hand, their smaller district magnitudes raise the effective threshold for repre-
sentation in each district, which can lead to less proportional and less frag-
mented representation; on the other hand, multiple districts may be expected
to fragment the party system by allowing regional parties to gain representa-
tion with electoral support from just one district and a very low proportion of
the national vote.
After the 1993 Constitution was implemented, some argued that elections
with a single national district favored Fujimori’s Lima-centered electoral
vehicles and hurt traditional parties with bases in the provinces. Fujimori’s
legislative candidates did not, however, do better in Lima than in the prov-
inces in those elections. In 1995, Change 90/New Majority (C90/NM)
received 51% of the legislative votes nationwide but just 47% in Lima. In
2000 Fujimori’s party received 42% of the legislative vote both in Lima and
nationwide. Traditional parties, such as APRA, AP, and IU, also did some-
what better nationwide than in Lima, but the effects were tiny in comparison
to the drop in support for these parties. Neither is it clear that the single
national electoral district had a strong fragmenting effect on the party system.
Between 1963 and 2001, the average effective number of partieswith legisla-
tive seats was 3.3 in multiple district elections and 3.4 in single national dis-
trict elections. The first elections after multiple districts were abandoned
(1995) saw a smaller effective number of parties than in the previous election,
and the first election aftermultiple districtswere restored (2001) saw a higher
effective number of parties than in the previous election. The evidence does
not support the argument that the single national electoral district had a sig-
nificant negative effect on the traditional parties.
The choice between multiple districts and a single national district did
have important consequences for governance. For example, Fujimori’s legis-
lative list won 52% of the vote and 56% of the seats in 1995. As Schmidt
(2000) demonstrated, if multiple districts had been employed in 1995 instead
of the single national district, Fujimori’s list—with the same proportion of
the vote (52%)—could have received as much as 77% of the seats. This
would have given Fujimori far more than the two-thirds majority he would
have needed to amend the constitution without a referendum and to control
the nomination and removal of themembers of such critical institutions as the
Constitutional Tribunal and the Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office.8
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1226 Table 4
Comparison of Legislative Elections With Single National and Multiple Departmental Districts, Peru, 2000-2001
2000 2001
Single District Multiple Districts Multiple Districts Single District
(Actual) (Hypothetical) Difference (Actual) (Hypothetical) Difference
% No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No.
Party Votes Seats Seats Seats Seats Seats Votes Seats Seats Seats Seats Seats
Perú 2000/C90NM 42.2 52 43.3 74 61.7 –22 4.8 3 2.5 6 5.0 –3
Perú Posible 23.2 29 24.2 32 26.7 –3 26.3 45 37.5 32 26.7 13
APRA 5.5 6 5.0 2 1.7 4 19.7 28 23.3 24 20.0 4
Unidad Nacional — — — — — — 13.8 17 14.2 17 14.2 0
Frente Independiente Moralizador 7.6 9 7.5 4 3.3 5 11.0 11 9.2 13 10.8 -2
Somos Perú/Causa Democracia 7.2 8 6.7 5 4.2 3 5.8 4 3.3 7 5.8 –3
Solidaridad Nacional 4.0 5 4.2 1 0.8 4 — — — — — —
Avancemos 3.1 3 2.5 2 1.7 1 — — — — — —
Unión por el Perú 2.6 3 2.5 0 0.0 3 4.1 6 5.0 5 4.2 1
Acción Popular 2.5 3 2.5 0 0.0 3 4.2 3 2.5 5 4.2 –2
FREPAP 2.2 2 1.7 0 0.0 2 1.7 0 0.0 2 1.7 –2
Solución Popular — — — — — — 3.6 1 0.8 4 3.3 –3
Todos por la Victoria — — — — — — 2.0 1 0.8 2 1.7 –1
Proyecto País — — — — — — 1.7 0 0.0 2 1.7 –2
Renacimiento Andino — — — — — — 1.4 1 0.8 1 0.8 0
Total 100 120 100 120 100 0 100 120 100 120 100 0
Source: Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales (http://www.onpe.gov.pe), author’s calculations.
Note: C90NM = Change 90/New Majority; APRA = American Popular Revolutionary Alliance; FREPAP = Popular Agricultural Front of Peru.
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Similarly, if the 2000 election had been run with the kind of multiple elec-
toral districts used in 2001, Fujimori would have been elected with an out-
right majority in the legislature (see Table 4). With 42% of the valid vote dis-
tributed as it was in 2000, Fujimori would have won some 74 seats (61.7%)
under the electoral rules used in 2001 instead of the 52 seats (43.3%) he actu-
ally won.With a comfortable majority in Congress, the outrageous buying of
legislators-elect that ultimately triggered the downfall of the regime would
have been unnecessary. Whether the regime would have survived is open to
question, but if it fell it would have done so in a very different way than actu-
ally happened.
The switch to multiple districts in 2001, which marked the first time since
1963 that a single national electoral district had been completely abandoned,
helped PP win as many as 13 additional seats in congress (see Table 4).
APRAwon 4 extra seats and theUnion for Peru 1,whereas the change did not
affect theNationalUnity orAndeanRebirth parties. The remaining eight par-
ties lost between 1 and 3 seats each under the multiple district system. This
has important consequences for governability, because majority coalition
formation would have been much more difficult if the election had been run
under the old rules.
Moreover, the changes made to the legislative electoral system in 2001
had very little to dowith the partial resurgence of the 1980s parties and candi-
dates. The party that benefited the most from the adoption of multiple elec-
toral districts in 2001 was PP, not a 1980s party. Among the 1980s parties,
APRAbenefitedmoderately from the new arrangements with four additional
seats, but AP lost two seats. In other words, the net gain due to the change in
the legislative electoral system was just two seats for the 1980s parties.
Although changes in the legislative electoral system have had important
political consequences, they did not play a central role in the collapse of the
1980s party system or its partial recovery.
THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL SYSTEM
MAJORITY RUNOFF
Themost important changes in the presidential electoral systemhave been
the adoption of majority runoff and incumbent reelection. The first of these
changes came in 1985, when Peru moved from a quasi-plurality format to a
top-two majority runoff format. Under the 1933 Constitution, to become
president a candidate had towin a simple plurality of the vote and gain amini-
mum of one third of the valid vote. If no candidate achieved one third of the
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vote, congress would choose the president from among the top three candi-
dates. The 1980 election was run under similar rules, with the threshold for
direct election set at 36%. Since 1985, presidents have been chosen accord-
ing to a majority runoff system: If no candidate wins more than 50% of the
votes, a runoff election is held between the top two first-round finishers.
Theory suggests that the introduction of a majority runoff system will
increase the number of candidates competing and result in a more frag-
mented party system, as measured by the effective number of parties.9
Because the threshold for success in the first round of the election is simply to
finish second, politicians will feel less compelled to form electoral alliances
or to avoid splitting from their parties, leading to competition by a larger
number of parties. From the point of view of voters, casting a “sincere” vote
for one’s first preference becomes less costly, because the second-round vote
can be used strategically to block the election of an undesired candidate. One
might expect, then, that the move to majority runoff would be accompanied
by an increase in the absolute number of parties and in the effective number
of parties competing for the presidency.
In Peru, this did not occur.10 Under the quasi-plurality system in effect
before 1985 the number of presidential candidates had already mushroomed
to 15 in 1980, before significant changes were made in the presidential elec-
toral system (see Table 3). When majority runoff was implemented in 1985,
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9. See Jones, 1995; Shugart and Carey, 1992; and Wright and Riker, 1989.
10. Thus, accounts such as Shugart and Carey (1992) present in Presidents and Assemblies
need to be corrected. They wrote
Peru is an example of a party system in which the use of majority runoff for presidential
elections may be blamed for a proliferation of candidates. What had been a two-bloc
party system before military intervention in 1968 led to two consecutive presidential
elections in the 1980s that were won by first-round majorities of valid votes cast. How-
ever, by 1990 themajority runoff rules encouraged two “outsiders” to enter the first round
as challengers to the established party system. With a decisive plurality election, such
proliferation would have been far less likely. (pp. 214-215)
(See also Cameron, 1994, p. 112, and Jones, 1995, p.101.) This paragraph contains three sig-
nificant errors that may have shaped Shugart andCarey’s overall evaluation ofmajority runoff in
Peru. In the first place, the party systembefore the 1968military coupwas a three-bloc, not a two-
bloc, system with an effective number of presidential parties of 2.98 and an effective number of
legislative parties of 3.54. Second, the implementation of majority runoff in 1985 was preceded
by a proliferation of candidates in 1980. Third, the 1980 election was not won by a first-round
majority of the valid votes cast but by a simple plurality of 45%. Neither is it true, as claimed by
McClintock (1994, p. 289), that “the number of parties competing for the presidencywas greater
after the introductionof the second-roundprocedure than before.” In Peru, as can be seen inTable
3, the implementation of presidential majority runoff brought neither a proliferation of presiden-
tial candidates, nor an increase in the effective number of presidential parties, nor a drop in the
size of presidential contingents in the legislature.
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the absolute number of parties fell in 1985 and 1990. It rose again in 1995 but
dropped to previous levels in 2000 and 2001. The effective number of presi-
dential parties also failed to follow the predicted pattern. Before the introduc-
tion ofmajority runoff, the effective number of presidential partieswent from
3.39 in 1962 to 2.98 in 1963 and to 3.45 in 1980. Instead of rising when
majority runoffwas implemented in 1985, the effective number of parties fell
to 2.76. It rose again in 1990 but fell back in 1995 and 2000. In 2001, it rose to
a level of 3.72. The average effective number of presidential parties during
the period of quasi-plurality elections was actually somewhat higher (3.27)
than under majority runoff (3.00). In Peru, the adoption of majority runoff
has not been associated with greater party system fragmentation.
What, then, were the political consequences of the adoption of presiden-
tial majority runoff? Schmidt (1996, p. 321) argues that one of the most
important electoral rules that led to Fujimori’s 1990 upset victory was presi-
dential majority runoff. Majority runoff, says Schmidt, “allowed Fujimori to
build support in two stages” (p. 348), and some might draw the conclusion
that majority runoff is especially advantageous for political outsiders (Jones,
1995, pp. 96-97). In Fujimori’s case this seems plausible, but we should be
cautious before concluding that presidential majority runoff contributed sig-
nificantly to the collapse of the 1980s party system or that it leads to the elec-
tion of outsider candidates generally.
Although it is true that majority runoff allows initially weak candidates to
build support in two stages, this does not entailmajority runoff promoting the
election of political outsiders inmost cases. Consider two kinds of situations:
one, when the top two first-round finishers are both party system insiders (as
was the case with García and Barrantes in 1985); the other, when they are
both outsiders (as was the case with Vargas Llosa and Fujimori in 1990,
Fujimori and Pérez de Cuellar in 1995, and Fujimori and Toledo in 2000).11
In both types of cases, the net benefit to outsiders is zero.
Even when a runoff pits an insider against an outsider, this will not neces-
sarily be to the advantage of the outsider. If the outsider happens to be the
front-runner in the first round (as would have been the case if Vargas Llosa
had faced APRA’s Alva Castro in the 1990 runoff, or as was the case when
Alejandro Toledo faced APRA’s Alan García in the 2001 runoff), the out-
sider’s first-round lead is put in jeopardy. For the two-round format towork to
the advantage of an outsider, it is necessary for the outsider to be the first-
round runner-up to an insider front-runner. Even then, whether the runoff
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11. I define as an outsider a politician who has become politically prominent from outside of
the national party system; political insiders are those who rise to political prominence from
within the party system, including those who subsequently break with their old parties to form
new ones (Kenney, 1998).
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favors an outsider depends on the outsider and insider’s locations with respect
to the distribution of voter preferences. In the simplest case of a single-issue
dimensionwith a normal distribution of voters, a two-round format will most
likely benefit the runoff candidate closest to the median voter. If the runoff
pits an insider centrist politician against an outsider who occupies an ideo-
logically extreme position, the runoff system actually makes it harder for the
outsider to come to power than would a simple plurality system.
Thus, although it is true that the majority runoff format favored Fujimori
in 1990, this was not a property of the electoral system itself but was highly
dependent on the positions of Fujimori and Vargas Llosa in relation to the
median voter. According to data from an April 1990 Apoyo poll, Fujimori’s
Change ‘90 partywas seen by voters as a centrist party (with amean ideologi-
cal location of 5.3 on a 10-point scale), whereas Vargas Llosa’s Democratic
Front (FREDEMO) alliancewas seen as far to the right (with amean ideolog-
ical location of 8.3). The advantage that accrued to Fujimori in 1990 had
everything to do with the fact that he was able to garner the support of most
voters in the center and to the left of the ideological spectrum, whereas
Vargas Llosa’s principal support was limited to the right. Outsiders such as
Lima’s Ricardo Belmont and Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez have easily won
election under plurality formats and would not necessarily be advantaged by
majority runoff formats.
PRESIDENTIAL REELECTION
The other major change in the presidential electoral system was allowing
immediate presidential reelection in 1995 and 2000, and its renewed prohibi-
tion in 2001. The presence of an incumbent running for reelection tends to
reduce party system fragmentation (Jones 1999), and the evidence from Peru
fits this patternwell. The average effective number of presidential partieswas
3.38 while reelection was prohibited but just 2.28 for the two elections in
which Fujimori ran for reelection.
Did the introduction of presidential reelection in 1995 contribute to the
collapse of the 1980s party system?To the extent that reelection strengthened
Fujimori, the greatest adversary of the 1980s party system, it may be said to
have played a role. Had Fujimori not run for reelection, it is possible that the
1980s parties—which still received 37% of the municipal vote in 1993—
could have enjoyed a partial recovery. However, two things should also be
kept in mind. First, the collapse of the party system began long before presi-
dential reelection was adopted, so the role of reelection in the collapse is lim-
ited to the final demise of the party system in 1995. Second, the leading oppo-
sition figures to Fujimori after the adoption of presidential reelection were
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not representatives of one of the 1980s parties, but party system outsiders.
Although presidential reelectionmay have hurt the 1980s parties in 1995 and
2000, the primary beneficiaries of a continued prohibition on presidential
reelection might well have been other outsider candidates rather than the
1980s parties.
Did the renewed prohibition of presidential reelection contribute to the
partial resurgence of traditional party candidates in 2001? Once Fujimori
fled the country, the question of presidential reelection became moot for the
2001 election. The primary beneficiary of Fujimori’s fall was another out-
sider, Alejandro Toledo, not a candidate associated with the 1980s parties.
Institutions matter, but exactly how institutions such as electoral systems
affect party systems requires careful analysis. Although Peru’s electoral sys-
tem has had an important role in shaping some specific aspects of the party
system, the overall relationship between electoral system change and the
most important changes in the party system is weak. In particular, electoral
system variables do little to explain the massive collapse of the 1980s party
system in the early 1990s and its partial recovery in 2001.
WHY IT HAPPENED III:
PERFORMANCE FAILURE AND THE
ROLE OF POLITICAL ELITES
Those who bear the greatest responsibility for the collapse of the party
system in Peru were those who successfully captured the political center, and
with it the presidency. Presidents Belaunde and García failed utterly to
resolve the dramatic economic and security crises Peru confronted in the
1980s. During the 5 yearsBelaundewas in office, per capitaGDP fell by 11%
and inflation accumulated to 3,584%. Belaunde also saw the eruption of a
dirty war that cost over 8,000 lives during his administration and made Peru
known as a land of torture andmass graves. Given his doleful performance in
government, it is unsurprising that Belaunde’s approval rating fell from 75%
in 1980 to just 26% by 1985, and that the public desisted from entrusting
national government to Belaunde’s AP party.
Belaunde’s failure contributed to García’s initial success. Where Belaunde
seemed feeble and out of touch, García represented vigor and a welcome
popular touch. Under García the economy first appeared to improve and the
deaths from political violence slowed, but by 1990 the hopes raised at the
beginning of García’s administration had been cruelly crushed. During
García’s administration, per capita GDP fell a total of 15%, and by his last
year in office annual inflation had skyrocketed to more than 3,800%. Accu-
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mulated inflation during García’s 5 years wasmore than 600 times that expe-
rienced under Belaunde. The number of dead continued tomount (more than
10,000 during García’s administration), and the number of subversive attacks
grew (from1,760 per year in 1984 to 3,149 per year in 1989).Moreover, by
the end of García’s government the Shining Path appeared to be making
qualitative advances in its war against the Peruvian state, andmany despaired
of ever defeating the group. García’s popularity fell even further than
Belaunde’s (from 90% to 21%, having reached a low of 9% in 1989), and the
only surprising thing about the 1990 elections is that García’s APRA party
did not do worse. After both administrations, the electorate punished the
incumbents by taking its votes elsewhere: AP’s presidential vote dropped 38
percentage points between 1980 and 1985, and APRA’s presidential vote fell
31 points between 1985 and 1990.
Public rejection of AP and APRA is easy to understand and was the great-
est source of electoral volatility in 1985 and 1990. To understand the full col-
lapse of the 1980s party system, we also need to ask why voters also turned
away from the other two important parties of the 1980s party system, IU and
the PPC. Two factors were primarily responsible for the PPC’s chronic elec-
toral weakness.12 First, the PPC was perceived as extremely conservative. In
June 1987, Apoyo poll respondents gave the PPC an average score of 8.3 on a
10-point left-right scale on which the average respondent was located at 5.4.
None of the principal parties were located farther (2.9 points) from the aver-
age voter in 1987 than the PPC. Second, the PPC was perceived as socially
exclusive. The vast majority of those who supported the PPC in Lima (73%,
according to a November 1986 Apoyo poll) came from the tiny upper and
small middle classes. The PPC appealed to fewer still in the rest of the coun-
try. In 1985, when the PPC made its strongest ever showing in a presidential
election, its candidatewon 19%of the vote in Lima but averaged less than 8%
in the departments and provinces outside of Lima. Even at the end ofGarcía’s
catastrophic administration in 1990, APRA’s presidential candidate received
almost twice the share of the national vote (23%)won by the PPC’s best pres-
idential candidate (12% in 1985).
The challenge for the various parties of the left in Peru was twofold: to
unite and remain united, and to find a way to appeal ideologically to a major-
ity of voters. The left in Peru was only partially successful on both counts.
After they failed to unite for the 1980 general elections, parties of themoder-
ate and radical left were brought together in an electoral front called the IU.
Between its debut in the 1980municipal elections and its rupture in 1989, the
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responsibility for the failures of the 1980-85AP-PPC coalition government, in fact, the PPC saw
its legislative and presidential vote increase slightly between 1980 and 1985.
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IU received on average twice as many votes as the PPC (between 23% and
31% of the national vote), winning the mayoralty in Lima in 1983, placing
second in the 1985 presidential election, and running first formanymonths in
the polls leading up to the 1990 presidential elections. Despite the support
given it by as much as a third of the electorate, the IU never became an orga-
nized political party; it remained an electoral front of fractious parties and
independents led first by Alfonso Barrantes and later by a collegial leader-
ship. It was divided not only by ideology and personal ambitions but also by
different bases of support, and a growing number of IU activists were not
members of any of its constituent parties but were independent members of
the electoral front.
The tensions between themoremoderate and radical wings of the IUwere
exacerbated by the worsening economic crisis, the emergence of the Shining
Path and Túpac Amaru insurgencies, Barrantes’s support of the García presi-
dency, and Barrantes’s own ambivalence as a candidate. When IU attempted
to become more than just an electoral front and organize itself as a member-
ship party in late 1988 and early 1989, these long-standing ideological and
personal differences came to the fore and led to its division into two electoral
alliances. One alliance retained the name of United Left, whereas the other
was known first as the Socialist Accord of the Left and then as the Socialist
Left (IS).
The public bickering surrounding IU’s schism and the fact of the schism
itself led the left to lose credibility as a force capable of governing the coun-
try. Looking and sounding like a dysfunctional family undergoing a particu-
larly messy divorce, the factions that had once constituted the IU became the
disunited left and thereby convinced most of the public that might have con-
sidered voting for them that neither organization was prepared to govern the
country at this critical juncture, and that a vote for eitherwould bewasted.13
Although the left’s downward trajectory was primarily a product of
domestic politics, it may have been furthered by the ideological dislocation
that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. By 1990 both of
the leftist alliances were perceived by voters to be farther to the left than the
IU had been in 1987 (seeApoyo polls, June 1987 andApril 1990). In thisway
the left removed itself as a serious alternative to the failed centrist parties, AP
and APRA. Coupled with the limitations of the PPC, the Peruvian party sys-
tem had exhausted itself. Every major party or alliance had made itself
unelectable, either by demonstrating incompetence and corruption while in
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government (AP and APRA), by failing to become more ideologically mod-
erate and socially inclusive (PPC), or by dividing prior to the elections while
remaining ideologically distant from the average voter (the left). Neither the
rise of the informal sector nor changes in the electoral system played as cen-
tral a role in the collapse of the Peruvian party system as the parties and their
leaders themselves.
PERFORMANCE FAILURE
AND ANTIPARTY SUCCESS
Into this political vacuum stepped Fujimori, with the support—at first
clandestine—of President García.14 Fujimori appeared out of nowhere, posi-
tioned himself in the center, and became the candidate of amajority of voters.
If Fujimori was initially the product of the collapse of support for the 1980s
parties, once in office he did much to undermine public support for parties,
and the final collapse of the party system came only as a consequence of his
success as an antiparty president. From his election in 1990 until his fall from
power in 2000, Fujimori epitomized the antiparty politician, attacking parties
as the source of all evil in politics. Fujimori’s antiparty discourse, coupled
with the very real corruption and incompetence of the 1980s parties and
Fujimori’s own success in stabilizing the economy, creating conditions for
macroeconomic growth, and defeating the Shining Path insurgency, cor-
roded most of what support remained for the 1980s parties after 1990.
Annual inflation had dropped to 10% by 1995, and GDP grew by 4.8% in
1993, 12.8% in 1994, and 8.6% in 1995. After the arrest of many Shining
Path leaders in 1992, the number of those killed in political violence fell dra-
matically, from 3,101 in 1992 to 652 in 1994 according to Interior Ministry
figures.
Fujimori’s actions also divided the already weakened parties, setting the
stage for their complete collapse. His lack of amajority in the legislature con-
tributed to the decision to close congress and suspend the constitution in
1992. International pressure led to new elections later that year, but the par-
ties split over whether to participate, further undermining the 1980s party
system. The 1995 electionsmarked the final collapse of the old party system,
a collapse confirmed in the 2000 elections.
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RESURRECTION?
Two kinds of resurrections took place in 2001. On one hand, well-known
politicians associated with the 1980s party system made a comeback. These
included Alan García (APRA), Lourdes Flores Nano (PPC, UN), and Javier
Diez Canseco (IU, Union for Peru), none of whom had run for office in 2000.
Flores Nano and Diez Canseco returned to prominence through new (UN) or
different (Union for Peru) electoral vehicles, while Alan García led his
APRA party to its best showing since he was elected president in 1985. This
signaled the second resurrection, not just of traditional politicians but of a tra-
ditional party. Over half of the first-round presidential vote went to candi-
dates associatedwith the 1980s parties (García and Flores Nano), and almost
half of the runoff vote went to García. Two of the traditional parties—APRA
and AP, Peru’s oldest parties—won close to a quarter of the legislative votes
and seats. Members of the PPC were also among the 17 UN candidates who
won seats.
Neither the fall of Fujimori nor the partial recovery of the 1980s parties
and politicians can be easily explained by structural or institutional factors.
The informal sector continued to grow slowly in the late 1990s, but there is
nothing in this pattern of growth that would explain Fujimori’s downfall. Nor
did changes in the electoral system lead to the partial recovery of the 1980s
politicians and parties.
Despite a drop in approval from 77% in August 1995 to 23% in July 1997
and poor economic performance in 1998 and 1999, Fujimori’s approval rat-
ings rose from 33% in December 1998 to 53% in December 1999, according
toApoyo. Even themany scandals surrounding the 2000 elections did not seri-
ously erode Fujimori’s approval levels, which remained above 50% between
December 1999 and June 2000. It was not until the 14 September 2000 broad-
cast of a video showing presidential adviser VladimiroMontesinos bribing a
legislator-elect to switch parties that the problem of corruption within the
regime undercut popular support for Fujimori. In October his approval rating
dropped to 36% and in November, just before his flight to Japan, faxed resig-
nation, and removal by congress, it dropped to 24%.
Corruption explains much of the collapse of the Fujimori regime, but it
does not explain the resurgence of the 1980s politicians and parties in 2001. It
stands to reason that opposition figures would be rewarded after many of
their allegations against the Fujimori administration were shown to be true.
Many of the leading opposition figures were themselves outsiders, however,
or at least sought to present themselves as disconnected from the 1980s par-
ties. It was not at all evident in 2000 that politicians associatedwith the 1980s
parties would benefit so strongly in the wake of Fujimori’s fall, and it was
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especially surprising that APRA’s García, whose name had been made syn-
onymouswith government incompetence and corruption, would do sowell.
Further research will be necessary to properly account for the unexpected
2001 resurgence of traditional parties and politicians, but it is enough for our
present purposes to note that it is unlikely that changes in social cleavages or
the electoral systemplayed amajor role. The partial rebirth of the 1980s party
system, like its earlier demise, seems to have been due far more to actions of
elites and the reactions of the public than to structural or institutional causes.
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